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When the trust between a government and its people is broken, democracy has difficulty 
functioning – low levels of trust can have negative consequences for society. In this 
thesis, I investigate the relationship between social networks and the American public’s 
trust in government. I focus on informal political discussion and knowledge in 
interpersonal networks, as deliberation has been highlighted as a potential remedy for 
some problems in society. I expect exposure to disagreement within informal political 
discussion to promote higher levels of trust, and exposure to political knowledge to 
suppress trust; I also investigate the related concepts of efficacy using the 2008-09 
American National Elections Studies Panel Study, I find some support for these 
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Introduction  
A free democratic society requires the people to trust that the government acts on 
their behalf.  Trust in government relates to many outcomes of interest: it influences the 
American people’s choice of candidates, rates of participation, and policy preferences, as 
well as their support for government involvement in their lives, their compliance with the 
law, and their opinions of the separate governmental branches (Gershtenson, Ladewig, & 
Plane 2006, 882). In young democracies “when public officials violate the rule of law and 
engage in corruption, public cynicism and distrust are likely results and threaten to 
undermine citizens’ commitments to democratic ideas” (Mishler and Rose 2005, 1062). 
This can cause instability in the political systems of these countries. Even in contexts 
with well established democracies, distrust can have significant impacts – as was 
observed during the 1990s in New Zealand, where the declining trust in government 
brought about serious political changes (Dalton 2005, 134).  
Of course, scholars worry about this in the United States as well. Putnam (1995) 
famously linked various changes in American society to declines in social capital (please 
see below); others have made the connection between low levels of trust and anti-
incumbent and third party support (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000, 240). 
Investigating trust in government is a pressing matter as evaluations of the “U.S. federal 
government have grown increasingly negative in recent decades” (Chanley, Rudolf, & 
Rahn, 2000, 239). In this study, I look into the factors that predict people’s trust in 
government, focusing on the role of social networks.  
Some social influence research in political science focuses on how ordinary 
citizens engage in political deliberation through everyday discussion and conversation. In 
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political science, political discussion and influence in social “networks are now assumed 
to be a central part of the explanation of political dynamics in a wide range of 
phenomena” (Heaney and McClurg 2009, 732). Deliberative democracy theory forms the 
theoretical backbone of a great deal of empirical political discussion research (Eveland, 
Morey & Hutchens 2011, 1085).  
Deliberative democracy is a “normative theory that suggests ways in which we 
can enhance democracy and criticize institutions” through political discussion among 
citizens (Chambers 2003, 308). Within this work, a great deal of research investigates 
disagreement in political conversation. According to Diana Mutz, people who are 
exposed to disagreement in political conversations are more likely to understand the 
rationale behind opposing viewpoints and are more likely to be politically tolerant (Mutz 
2006, 84).  
Building upon her findings for tolerance, I explore whether disagreement has 
similar consequences for trust. Are those who are exposed to more disagreement more 
likely to have higher levels of trust? I also explore whether the level of sophistication 
present in political discussion influences a person’s trust, and the relationships between 
these concepts and the related concept of efficacy. 
In this context, “sophistication” refers to the political knowledge of the people 
with which a person discusses politics, in addition to people’s own knowledge about 
politics. To gather information people “communicate, they argue, and they accumulate 
political information through an ongoing process of social interaction” (Huckfeldt 2001, 
426) instead of independently gathering information about politics. Does a person’s level 
of political knowledge influence their level of trust in government? Do people trust 
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government more or less if they are more knowledgeable about how it operates? 
Research has shown that knowing the influence of special interests, disagreement, and the 
dysfunction in Congress leads to lower levels of trust. According to Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse, part of the reason that people do not trust the government is that seeing 
disagreement in politics is interpreted as an “absence of productivity” (Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse, 2002, 122). When people know more about the political process they see 
politicians as “susceptible to special interest influence not just because they are weak but 
because it is in their financial interest” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002, 122). The 
knowledge people bring into political discussion and importantly, the knowledge that 
they are exposed to from others via networks might influence how much they trust 
government.  
In the following sections, I begin by examining the idea of trust. After a 
discussion of definitions (and a review of trust research), I move on to political 
discussion, noting the empirical research into political discussion, disagreement and 
sophistication.  
Trust in Government 
In answering whether political discussion and knowledge influences trust, the first 
task is to define the concept of political trust (and distinguish it from related concepts). 
Trust in government involves a variety of aspects - sometimes these are combined into an 
overall evaluation of trustworthiness. According to Levi and Stoker the accepted 
definition of trust is a relational concept such that an “individual making herself 
vulnerable to another individual, group, or institution that has the capacity to do her harm 
or to betray her” (Levi and Stoker 2000, 476).  
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General political trust is “composed primarily of evaluations of public officials, 
political institutions, and satisfaction with public policies” (Mangum 2012, 3). However, 
trust is rarely generalized and is usually limited to “specific domains” (Levi and Stoker 
2000, 476). For example, a person might differentiate their evaluations of different 
institutions versus politicians. People may also trust some institutions with specific 
policies and responsibilities, but not others. For example, a person can trust Congress to 
fund a powerful army but not to make reasonable tax laws. An important part of trust in 
government is how well it lives up to the expectations of the people (Mangum 2012, 3). 
Political trust can mean how much confidence a citizen has that incumbents will carry out 
their desired policies. It can also mean how confident they are that politicians will govern 
honestly, how confident that the political process works, and how benevolent the 
government seems to be.  
While I am looking into how disagreement and sophistication influence trust in 
government, an important related concept that motivates this thesis – but that I 
distinguish from trust - is social capital. Social capital is often defined broadly, and might 
be thought of as including trust. Putnam calls it the “features of social organization such 
as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for 
mutual benefit” (1995, 66). Civic engagement is also related to interpersonal trust, 
because people who are not civically engaged “are likely to feel a lack of political 
influence, which causes feelings of powerlessness that fuel cynicism and distrust toward 
political and social leaders, the institutions of government, and the regime as a whole” 
(Keele 2007, 244). In addition to trust, I examine how networks influence internal and 
external efficacy. Internal efficacy refers to how much one feels they can influence the 
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government; external efficacy refers to how responsive one feels government is to them 
(Finkel 1985, 892). One reason to examine how social networks – i.e., interpersonal 
interactions – predict trust in government, and patterns of efficacy is that trust in 
government has been linked to interpersonal trust. In fact “interpersonally distrusting 
citizen projects his or her misanthropic tendencies onto government” (Keele 2007, 244). 
In other words, aside from the work of Mutz and colleagues, there seems to be a natural 
connection between social factors and trust in government.  
Political distrust can have both positive and negative influences on society. An 
important aspect of a working democracy involves the idea of legitimacy. If people 
distrust the government for a long period of time, they “may challenge its legitimacy and, 
ultimately, its very existence” (Erber and Lau 1990, 236). The evidence for this claim 
comes from how trust influences support for democratic ideas and for the regime. Mishler 
and Rose looked into both of these areas in a study concerning Russia, which is in a 
“continuing transition from an authoritarian past” (Misher and Rose 200-5, 1052). The 
authors explore whether interpersonal trust and institutional trust had any influence on 
regime support in Russia and found that the “direct effect of institutional trust on support 
(beta = .04) is small and not statistically significant, as is the direct effect of interpersonal 
trust on support for the current regime (beta = –.02)” (Mishler and Rose 2005, 1064). 
While Mishler and Rose found that interpersonal trust has no influence on the support of 
democratic ideals, they found that institutional trust had moderately positive influence on 
support for democratic ideals (Mishler and Rose 2005, 1066). In contrast Chu et al. found 
that trust was more important for the support for democratic ideals. When considering 
many different influences on democratic legitimacy, “trust in democratic institutions and 
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the free and fair voting process does the most to encourage popular approval of the way 
that democracy works” (Chu et al. 2008, 84). The amount that trust comparatively 
mattered to support for democratic ideals was influence by socioeconomic status and by 
regional differences (Chu et al. 2008, 81-82).1 
While instability in other countries is the most dramatic consequence of distrust in 
government, in the United States we can see lower political participation rates due to 
distrust (Erber and Lau 1990, 236). There has been a lot of research into the types of 
participation that are influenced by trust. In an examination of “NES data over time, Luks 
(1998) finds that in no election were the distrusting more likely than the trusting to vote, 
but they were more likely to engage in other forms of electoral participation in the late 
1980s and 1990s” (Levi and Stoker 2000, 487). Mishler and Rose found that higher 
institutional trust “contributes significantly to political involvement,” along with social 
capital that has a “moderate but significant effects on political involvement” (Mishler and 
Rose 2005, 1068). Social capital and trust in government can act similarly on people’s 
actions. 
 Both conservatives and liberal politicians suffer under low trust levels. Liberals 
need “people to trust the government to support more government” (Hetherington and 
Husser 2012, 312). Specifically, Democrats need high political trust levels to create new 
or expanded social support programs. A Democratic regime would have trouble 
increasing taxes for a larger social security program if the people did not believe that the 
government would use the new tax money appropriately. Political trust is also required 
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for conservative (i.e., generally Republican) goals such as a strong active foreign policy 
and a strong military (Hetherington and Husser 2012, 313).  
Participation is perhaps the most obvious victim of distrust. Why would someone 
vote if they do not believe that they government will be responsive to the will of the 
voters? The common hypothesis is that political cynics – or people low in trust – would 
reject “conventional or ‘conformist’ modes of political participation such as voting, 
lobbying, writing letters to members of Congress, and campaigning for political 
candidates” (Citrin 1974, 979).  Instead, they would be more likely to support “non-
customary, sometimes illegal, activities such as participating in sit-ins or riots, or 
organizing for revolution” (Citrin 1974, 979). This makes sense when we consider the 
radical actions and large decline in political trust during the 1960’s and 1970’s. However, 
Citrin found that distrust in government has no independent influence on support for, or 
involvement in non-customary participation (Citrin 1974, 982). Citrin also found people 
who distrust government do not have different conventional participation levels than high 
trust individuals (1974, 982). Studies into social capital have found that “the proportion 
of Americans saying that most people can be trusted fell by more than a third between 
1960, when 58 percent chose that alternative, and 1993, when only 37 percent did” 
(Puntam 1995, 72) – this corresponds with a decline in civic engagement. In the 
following sections, I briefly discuss various explanations for different levels of political 
trust.  While each of these has helped us understand trust, I then explain why it is 
important to research how political discussion and disagreement exert influence. 
Explanations for Trust in Government 
Long-term political distrust by people can be an “indicator of dissatisfaction with 
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the quality of life they are experiencing” (Miller 1974, 951). This means that if people’s 
economic situation is extremely dire, people distrust government. Research has shown 
that economic evaluations are “a leading cause of trust: when citizens are dissatisfied 
with economic performance, distrust of government ensues, but when prosperity 
abounds, so will trust” (Keele 2007, 242). This is in line with one of the main aspects of 
trust: people’s expectation of the government. People expect the government to ensure a 
strong economy and opportunities for good standard of living.  
Another measure of trust in the literature is based on the argument that trust in 
government is partly determined by the “distance between the individual’s own policy 
preference and the policy alternative that he identified with a particular party” (Miller 
1974, 965). Miller finds the effect of trust – thought of in terms policy alternatives – is 
really more important than that of partisanship.2 His study indicates that incidents causing 
dissatisfaction with a government or party’s policies also decrease trust in government. 
An example of this is seen in the effects of the Vietnam War where Miller attributes the 
sharp decrease in trust in the government to President Nixon’s policies towards the war 
(Miller 1974, 969).  
Another explanation for the declines in trust is an increase in education. Between 
1958 and 2000, the number of people with some level of education increased from 20% 
to 49% (Dalton 2005, 143). And, that in the “late 1950’s and early 1960s, better-educated 
Americans were more trustful of government” than less educated Americans (Dalton 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Miller ruled out partisanship because there was a “close similarity between the group mean cynicism 
value for Republicans (2.28) and white Democrats (2.50)” (Miller 1974, 965). He found that when trust 
was measured during a Republican administration “Republicans were, on the whole, less dissatisfied than 
Democrats” in the policies of the administration (Miller 1974, 965). His data also showed that people 
whose policies were completely in line with their parties were more trusting of the government than 
independents (who were dissatisfied with both parties) (Miller 1974, 968). 
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2005, 140). As the population became more educated, by the same route, trust in 
government should have increased. However, this relationship between education and 
trust switched completely. Those who are more educated trusted government less than 
those less educated. Hakhverdian and Mayne contend that the “effect of education on 
institutional trust is not uniform across countries, but rather depends on the context in 
which citizens are nested” (Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012, 745). The context that the 
authors talk about is the amount of corruption in each country. The highly educated in 
highly corrupt countries are more distrustful of institutions than those with less education; 
the opposite is true for low corruption countries.  
Generational change is another explanation given by Dalton for declines in trust 
in government. In a study he found that “older and more trustful citizens are gradually 
being replaced by younger and more cynical individuals” (Dalton 2005, 145). Each 
preceding generation started out more distrustful than the previous one. While this might 
be due to a number of variables, the results show that preceding generations had different 
trends of trust as they aged, which does point to some relationship between generational 
change and trust. Dalton looked at four generations’ changes in trust in government over 
their lifetimes and found that earlier generations’ trust grew as they aged – the younger 
generations trust levels have decreased as they aged (Dalton 2005, 144). 3 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  In addition to the starting trust levels of each generation, change has also occurred in how the generations 
interact with trust over their life spans. The younger generations lower starting levels of trust also spurred 
major student movements in the 1960’s and 1970’s which were the “first radical critiques of democracy” 
(Dalton, 2005, 144). Dalton does not explain why each generation is different than the previous one in 
terms of their changing trends in trusting government. A confounding variable that would challenge 
Dalton’s theory is that disappointing government policies such as the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, 
and the turmoil of the civil rights movement could change people’s opinions across generations. In a study 
looking at how Vietnam influenced trust across two generations, Gregory Markus found that over a time 
period between 1965 and 1973, “cynicism levels increased significantly for members of both generations 
regardless of previous orientations” (Markus 1979, 349). In other words, Dalton is not considering the 
influence of an event that changes attitudes across generations. Also technology has increased the visibility 
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Social Networks and Trust in Government 
Improving democracy through political discussion in social networks is a key 
argument in studies of deliberative democracy. Deliberative Democracy Theory is a 
normative theory that has become more empirical as its claims have been tested. 
Deliberation is “debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well informed 
opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new 
information, and claims made by fellow participants” (Chambers 2003, 309). 
There are two kinds of political discussions: informal and formal. Formal 
discussion takes place within the limits of certain rules and settings – for example town 
hall meetings, congressional debates, and political speeches. Informal political discussion 
takes place in “everyday life and social interaction outside of the political realm” 
(Eveland, Morey & Hutchens 2011, 1083). Informal discussion is the focus of in the 
present study, though I first briefly discuss the literature on formal deliberation, as it 
informs the work on informal deliberation/discussion.  
Formal Deliberation 
Deliberation is a way for opposing parties to understand each other. While 
participation is often thought to be the most important aspect of democracy (and 
specifically, the act of voting), Deliberative Democracy theorists believe that deliberation 
itself is also extremely important for a healthy democracy. That is to say that although 
participation is the actions that make a democracy, deliberation is the collective thought 
process of a democracy. The theory posits that deliberation is a way of coming to 
collective decisions in the midst of conflict as deliberation allows differing parties to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of the government and increased the availability of information – both of which could have decreased the 
starting trust levels of the younger generations.  
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“criticize one another’s proposals and reasons and are open to being criticized by others” 
(Young 2001, 672). A central aspect of democracy is the ability to compromise and come 
to a singular decision. These agreements also occur due to deliberation, and are not the 
“result of threat or force” (Young 2001, 672). The idea that deliberation is a peaceful way 
of coming to a decision is important for democracy, because it keeps one group from 
feeling they were forced into a collective policies. This relates to the notion that the 
“decisions it produces are more legitimate,” because deliberation is better at reflecting the 
preferences of the populations than participatory democracy alone (Thompson 2008, 
498). Legitimacy should increase if all the other arguments hold true – in turn, it makes 
sense to think that trust would also be strengthened through deliberation.   
A minor argument in this literature is that discussion increases the education of 
the participants (Cooke 2000, 948). Discussion is a way for opposing parties to 
understand each other, and this new understanding is an effective transfer of new 
information, which educates both parties. Another proposed benefit of deliberation is that 
it creates a sense of community among the participants. This is because “participants are 
forced to think of what could count as a good reason for all others involved in, or affected 
by, the decisions under discussion” (Cooke 2000, 950). In a deliberative discussion the 
participants are perspective taking. That is, the parties place themselves in each others 
shoes and thus creates a greater sense of connectedness by removing their ‘otherness.’ A 
more harmonious environment makes for a more productive and healthy democracy. 
Since a working community requires trust, if discussion does improve democracy (as 
predicted), it should also improve political trust.  
Informal Deliberation/Discussion in Networks 
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Disagreement during an informal discussion is to be expected and researchers 
have looked into how it influences attitudes, viewpoints, tolerance, and participation. 
Deliberative Democracy Theory claims that deliberation will increase awareness of one’s 
own reasons for holding a viewpoint, increase awareness of an opposing viewpoint, and 
increase tolerance of others. In Diana Mutz’s book Hearing the Other Side, she found 
that while engaging in cross-cutting or contentious discussion does lead to an increase in 
understanding others’ rationales for their viewpoint, it did not increase people’s 
understanding of their own rationales (Mutz 2006, 72). She also found that “people’s 
awareness of rationales for others’ views should be most predictive of political tolerance” 
(Mutz 2006, 77). This result was limited by people’s cognitive capacity for perspective 
taking. Mutz concludes that disagreement does have beneficially effects on legitimacy 
and tolerance. She also notes that "although trust has not been directly examined here, it 
goes hand in hand with homogeneity of views" (Mutz 2006, 87); this encourages me to 
look into the benefits of disagreement on trust.  
It is important to note that disagreement is not always a positive influence on 
democracy. According to Mutz, disagreement also harms democratic society by 
decreasing the rates of participation. She attributes this decline in participation to two 
different aspects of the human psyche: social accountability and ambivalence. Mutz 
found “that people entrenched in heterogeneous social networks retreat from political 
activity mainly out of a desire to avoid putting their social relationships at risk” (Mutz 
2006, 123). People do not want to alienate friends by actively taking part in politics – 
they fear insulting their friends with opposing views. Also, those that engage in more 
political disagreement become more ambivalent about politics, which has negative effects 
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on participation. However, there is some disagreement about this finding. Another 
scholar contends that if someone has likeminded individuals in their social network, 
despite having a heterogeneous social group they have enough support to encourage their 
participation in politics (Bello 2012, 791). Participation levels among those that had 
disagreement in their conversations compared to those that did not might provide 
evidence for either hypothesis.  
Like disagreement in conversation, political sophistication has been researched to 
determine if it has positive influences on democracy. When researchers are looking into 
the sophistication of discussion, they are looking at the expertise or political knowledge 
of the participants in the social network. Specifically researchers are interested in how 
this knowledge is being transferred between individuals, because people are limited in 
their information gathering abilities and “interpersonal networks help circumvent these 
individual limitations” (McClurg 2006, 739). If the knowledge that is being transferred 
by those who are more knowledgeable is less favorable to the government, does this 
mean that sophistication will have a suppressing influence on trust? Previous research has 
found that that “knowledge even showed to have a suppressing effect on trust, though this 
relationship was not significant” (Grimmelikhuijsen 2009, 181).  
Unlike with disagreement, McClurg argues that sophistication will increase 
political participation.  The benefits to less knowledgeable individuals, from getting 
information from knowledgeable individuals, includes “access to information that helps 
people recognize and reject dissonant political views, develop confidence in their 
attitudes, and avoid attitudinal ambivalence, thereby making participation more likely” 
(McClurg 2006, 737). The rejection of dissonant political views might work the same as 
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disagreement on political trust. That is, it might make people recognize that extreme 
views on how trustworthy the government is less acceptable to people. However, 
increasing someone’s confidence in their attitudes might make someone more adamant 
about their mistrust in government. McClurg’s analysis found that the overall most 
important benefit to participation from expertise in networks was that it “counteracts the 
negative effect of disagreement on ambivalence” (McClurg 2006, 748).  
Expectations 
 The literature on social influence leads me to the my first, central hypothesis: 
Following Mutz’s (2006) work on disagreement and tolerance, I expect to find a positive 
relationship between the amount of disagreement a person encounters during political 
discussion, and her level of trust in government.  
Chamber’s describes deliberation as “debate and discussion aimed at producing 
reasonable, well informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences 
in light of discussion, new information, and claims by fellow participants” (Chambers 
2003, 309). Following this, I argue that when encountering disagreement in social 
networks, people will come to a more rational consensus on governmental 
trustworthiness. One of the main goals of deliberative democracy is that “the legitimacy 
of outcomes (understood as justification to all affected) ideally characterizes 
deliberation” (Chambers 2003, 309). When people feel as if they have reached a more 
legitimate decision after a discussion, it is reasonable to expect that they might have more 
trust in the actors involved in the policy. Mutz found that disagreement has a strong 
relationship with understanding the rationales for opposing views (2002, 116). In addition 
she found that closer relationships between participants with opposing viewpoints and a 
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greater understanding of those viewpoints predicts tolerance (Mutz 2002, 119). Following 
these connections, I expect people who encounter interpersonal political difference – 
even after controlling for other factors – to be more trusting of government. 
My second central hypothesis is that sophistication in networks will have a 
negative relationship with trust. The logic for this expectation comes from the research 
on political knowledge and sophistication, whether examined at the individual or network 
level. Knowing too much about the political process has been shown to decrease 
governmental approval ratings. One of the reasons that Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 
explain why the Supreme Court has higher approval ratings than Congress is because 
“congressional procedures are very open,” while the Supreme Court is not transparent in 
its decision-making (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002, 99). Seeing disagreement in 
politics makes people think that there is an “absence of productivity” (Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse, 2002, 122). When people see that their elected leaders are not being 
productive they do not trust them to perform their jobs. I expect that people who are more 
knowledgeable will pay more attention to the actions of the government and will pick up 
on more actions; this will lower their trust levels (though for evidence supporting the 
opposite expectation, see Mishler and Rose 2005: 1068).  
The sophistication of a network is determined by the expertise of its members. If 
the expectation is that knowledge decreases trust, then people residing in networks that 
have high levels of political knowledge may be additionally influenced to distrust 
government. This is because “political discussion is an efficient way to minimize the 
information costs of political engagement” (Huckfeldt 2001, 426), and allows people to 
retrieve political information more easily; this may be especially true for those that are 
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not politically knowledgeable. People are susceptible to being unduly influenced by these 
biased experts because of the “the cognitive shortcuts people employ in politics often fail 
to help people develop opinions and attitudes that are similar to what they would possess 
if they were themselves experts” (McClurg 2006, 740).  
Another reason why sophistication might have a suppressing effect on trust is 
because talking with political experts makes people “identify, reject, and understand the 
relevance of dissonant political information exchanged in their networks” (McClurg 
2006, 740). This might work against the potential “benefits” of disagreement with respect 
to trust. McClurg points out that by identifying dissonant political information, people 
“reduce ambivalence about and increase confidence in their political views” (McClurg 
2006, 740). If people already have a distrustful attitude towards government they might 
become more resolute and more vocal in their feelings. This would show up in my 
analysis as lower trust levels among people who engage discussion with the politically 
sophisticated.   
Other Expectations 
 While trying to isolate the effects of my main independent variables to test my 
hypotheses, I will be controlling for additional factors. For several of these, I have 
expectations grounded in the literature. For example, based on the research on trust, I 
expect that the strength of partisanship will have a positive relationship with it. While 
partisans of any stripe are distrustful of government, independents who find that neither 
party has the ability to solve social problems are the most distrustful of government 
(Miller 1974, 968). Age should have a positive relationship with trust due to the findings 
that “over time older and more trustful citizens are gradually replaced by younger and 
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more cynical individuals” (Dalton 2005, 145). Finally, education should have a negative 
relationship with trust – this is based on Dalton’s study, which found that “over time the 
trust levels of the better-educated decrease at a steeper rate, and in relative terms trust 
levels increase among the lesser-educated” (Dalton 2007, 140).  
Data and Methods 
My analysis examined data from the 2008-2009 ANES study. The study was 
conducted over roughly one year between January 2008 and September 2009. 
Participants were gathered through random-digit-dialing, which means that random 
telephones numbers are dialed, and those who answered are asked if they want to 
participate in the study. Participants were paid ten dollars for each 30-minute monthly 
survey they had taken online. Of the twenty-one surveys waves taken, only ten were 
chiefly concerned with politics. Across the waves, 1,420 of 2,665 completed the surveys. 
The study is quite large and included a wide range of topics about politics. In this study I 
am mainly concerned with looking at the trust in government (and efficacy) items, the 
section on social networks, and the political knowledge items. I will also control for key 
variables including strength of partisanship, gender, age, education, and income.  
In the ANES study there was only one trust item included. This was used in six 
different waves and reads as: 
How often does the federal government do what most Americans want it to do? 
(Always, most of the time, about half the time, once in a while, or never. / Never, 
once in a while, about half the time, most of the time, or always.) 
This item serves as the dependent variable in my analysis. Three of the waves were 
before the 2008 general election, and three were after the general election. These waves 
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include:  February 2008, September 2008, October 2008, November 2008, May 2009, 
and July 2009.  
 The main independent variables measure characteristics of political discussion. 
The September 2008 wave included a complete battery of items that measure different 
aspects of social networks (this is, “a network battery”). The first item asks whether the 
participants had discussed government or the election in the previous six months. The 
next question measures the size of their social networks – respondents were asked to 
write down the names of people with which they discuss politics. The battery includes 
many demographic questions about these named individuals. I use two items to measure 
how much disagreement is present in people’s social networks. The first is: 
In general, how different are (NAME)’s opinions about government and elections 
from your own views? (Extremely different, very different, moderately different, 
slightly different, or not different at all? / Not different at all, slightly different, 
moderately different, very different, or extremely different?) 
The second question is:  
Generally speaking, does (NAME) probably think of (himself/herself) as a 
Democrat, Republican, independent, or something else? (follow-ups are asked to 
measure partisanship of network members on 7 points) 
 I create two different measures of the average amount of disagreement in a 
person’s discussion network, The first measures the average amount of disagreement a 
person encounters, using the overall amount of opinion difference in the network (from 
the first question). The second measures the average amount of disagreement a person 
has in her network – this is based on how much of the network differs from the 
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respondent in partisanship. I use two different measures of disagreement, as some 
research has found that different measures of disagreement have different relationships 
with things (Klofstad, Sokhey and McClurg 2013).  
The other key item I use indirectly measures how knowledgeable the members of 
their social networks are:  
 What is the highest degree or level of school (NAME) has completed? 
While not a perfect measure, the question implies knowledge in political discussion, as 
people who are more educated tend to know more about politics (Highton 2009).    
Preliminary Analysis 
Descriptive Statistics  
Scores of trust, external efficacy, and internal efficacy range between 1 (low) to 5 
(high). Across 4 waves in the ANES survey, the mean trust levels among panel 
respondents remains the same, at around 2.44 (see table 1); the average trust level is low, 
but close to the midrange of trust (which is not as low as would be expected give 
previous research). The mean scores for external efficacy measures also range from 1 to 
5; the external efficacy measures are also quite similar to each other across waves, and 
fall in the low middle range (2.48) of possible external efficacy levels (see table 1). The 
same is true for internal efficacy, but the means (2.66) were slightly closer to the median 
trust level than trust or external efficacy (see table 1).  
 Table 2 shows the means of my key independent variables (i.e., the social 
networks items), and my control variables. Respondents’ network size ranges from zero 
to three with the average being (2.28); people tended to have large political discussion 
networks (at least given the range of the measure). The average sophistication (formal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Milman	  	  21	  
education) of the discussion networks is high (8.61), given a scale between 0 and 14 
categories of formal education. The average the amount of overall disagreement (1.79) 
within the social networks was low, given that the range of disagreement runs from 0 (all 
network members are not different from the main respondent) to 5 (all the network 
members are very different from the main respondent). Average partisan disagreement 
encountered in networks of subjects (0.29) was low, given the range from 0 to 1. This 
number means that, on average, a respondent’s discussion network was about 1/3 
disagreeable in terms of partisanship. 
Correlations 
 The first analyses I present are a series of correlations (please see table 3). All of 
the major independent variables are highly correlated with one another. The relationship 
between network sophistication and overall disagreement is positive (r=0.76) and 
statistically significant (p=0.00). The relationship between network sophistication and 
partisan disagreement is positive (r=0.40) and statistically significant (p=0.00). Overall 
disagreement and partisan disagreement have a positive (r=0.57) relationship that was 
statistically significant (p=0.00).  
 All the dependent variables are also highly correlated with one another. The 
correlation between trust and external efficacy is positive (r=0.49) and statistically 
significant (p=0.00). Overall trust and internal efficacy has a positive (r=0.42) 
statistically significant relationship (p=0.00), as do both efficacies with one another 
(r=0.45; statistically significant relationship, p=0.00). 
Simple regressions 
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 Before I discuss my main models, I first perform simple regressions involving 
each of the dependent variables, and the two of the major dependent variables capturing 
social network characteristics. 
Dependent Variable: Trust  
 In table 4 I investigate if there is a relationship between sophistication, overall 
disagreement, and trust (see table 4). Sophistication has a positive and statistically 
significant (p=0.00) relationship with trust, though the effect is quite small. The direction 
of this relationship does not support my hypothesis that sophistication would have a 
suppressing effect on trust. Overall disagreement had a negative and statistically 
insignificant effect (p=0.97), which also does not support my (first) hypothesis.  
 In the second model, I investigate the relationship between sophistication, partisan 
disagreement and trust, looking at two key independent variables at the same time (see 
table 4, right columns). Again sophistication seems to predict more trust in government, 
with a positive and statistically significant relationship (p=0.00). As with overall 
disagreement, partisan disagreement had a net negative and statistically insignificant 
(p=0.17) effect on trust (which does not support hypothesis one).  
Dependent Variable: Internal efficacy  
 The first model examines whether there was an effect between network 
sophistication, overall disagreement, and internal efficacy (please see table 5). The level 
of network sophistication again predicts an increase in individuals’ feelings of internal 
efficacy, with a positive and statistically significant (p=0.00) – if small – effect. Overall 
disagreement does not appear to have an effect on feelings of internal efficacy, as the 
coefficient is negative, small, and statistically insignificant (p=0.78).  
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 The second model repeats the logic of Table 4; it investigates whether there are 
effects on internal efficacy if sophistication and the other measure of disagreement – 
partisan disagreement – are modeled together (see table 5, right columns). Sophistication 
continued to have a positive and statistically significant (p=0.00) effect on internal 
efficacy. Unlike overall disagreement, partisan disagreement did have a statistically 
significant (p=0.00) effect on internal efficacy, despite it being negative. This shows that 
partisan disagreement has a suppressing effect on internal efficacy, which is contrary to 
expectations.   
Dependent Variable: External efficacy 
 The first external efficacy model tests sophistication and overall disagreement 
(please see table 6). As in the case of the previous models for trust and internal efficacy, 
network sophistication has a positive and statistically significant (p=0.00) effect on 
external efficacy – feelings of external efficacy, or how responsive a person thinks the 
government is to them – increases with increases in sophistication in participant social 
networks. Overall disagreement had a negative and (just barely) statistically insignificant 
(p=0.11) effect on external efficacy.  
 The second model investigates the effects of sophistication and partisan 
disagreement on external efficacy (please see table 6, right columns). Sophistication 
again had a positive and statistically significant (p=0.00) effect. Partisan disagreement 
displays a similar effect on external efficacy as it did in the case of internal efficacy – it 
has a negative and statistically significant effect (p=0.01) on external efficacy. 
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Multivariate Analysis 
 In the previous models, I was looking at the effects of one key independent 
variable, while controlling for the other. But to better isolate the relationships between 
my independent variables and dependent variables, I now control for additional variables. 
Specifically, I control for six variables that could have effects on the dependent variables: 
age, gender, income, education, knowledge, and strength of partisanship.  
Dependent Variable: Trust 
 In the first model specification I tested sophistication and overall disagreement 
with the control variables (please see table 7). With this model I find that the effect of 
sophistication on trust disappears. The effect remains positive, but is almost zero, and 
becomes statistically insignificant (p=0.62). This result does not confirm my hypothesis 
that sophistication would have a suppressing effect on trust. The effect of overall network 
disagreement on trust is negative, but statistically insignificant (p=0.43). This shows that 
overall disagreement did not positively influence trust in government, contrary to 
expectations. Strength of partisanship and political knowledge are important factors to 
control for, they are the only controls to have statistically significant relationships with 
trust in government.  
 In the second model I test sophistication and the other measure of disagreement –
partisan disagreement – with the additional control variables (see table 7, right columns). 
In this model, sophistication’s effect on trust remains positive but becomes statistically 
insignificant (p=0.13). The effect of partisan disagreement on trust becomes positive but 
remains statistically insignificant (p=0.93). Both of these results do not support either 
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hypothesis. Again political knowledge and partisanship have positive and significant 
effects on trust.  
Dependent Variable: Internal Efficacy 
 The first model examines whether sophistication and overall network 
disagreement influences internal efficacy (see table 8) – recall that variable captures the 
idea of whether a person feels that they can influence the government. The effect of 
network sophistication on internal efficacy in government remains positive, but is not 
statistically significant (p=0.37). Overall disagreement’s effect on internal efficacy is 
quite small; it is positive but not statistically significant (p=0.74). The only major control 
variable that is significant in this model is strength of partisanship, which has a positive 
and sizable effect.  
 In a familiar pattern, the second model tests whether sophistication and partisan 
disagreement have any effect on feelings of internal efficacy (see table 8, right columns). 
The effect of sophistication on internal efficacy is positive and statistically significant 
(p=0.02). The negative, insignificant (p=0.06) effect for partisan disagreement differs 
from the significant result of the simple regression (Table 5). Strength of partisanship 
continues to be a positive and sizable variable.   
Dependent Variable: External efficacy  
 The first multivariate model predicting external efficacy investigates the effects of 
sophistication and overall disagreement (see table 9). The effect of sophistication on 
external efficacy remains (p=0.09), but becomes even smaller. Overall disagreement 
remained negative and statistically insignificant (p=0.78) when controlling for other 
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independent variables. Gender, education, and partisanship were all major significant 
variables in this model, each having positive and significant effects.  
 The second model tests whether sophistication and partisan disagreement have 
any effects on external efficacy (see table 9). In this model (2), sophistication works in 
the same way as in the previous model (1) but with a statistically significant (p=0.02) 
relationship. However, the control variables eliminate the previous relationship observed 
between partisan disagreement on external efficacy (Table 6). The effect of partisan 
disagreement remains negative, but dramatically changes to become statistically 
insignificant (p=0.45).  
Discussion 
 From my initial, descriptive results, I found a strong connection between trust, 
internal efficacy, and external efficacy – Something that is expected, as these things are 
sometimes talked about together (Erikson and Tedin 2011). Across the different waves of 
the survey, the means for each concept were quite similar/stable, and the measures were 
highly correlated with each other. Given the connection between all the three variables in 
previous literature, and the connection in my results, it is no surprise that there are many 
similarities in each of these dependents variable’s patterns of relationships with 
disagreement and sophistication. 
 Do social networks influence trust? Initially, in my analysis I saw that network 
sophistication actually had the opposite effect on trust than expected. Being around 
people who know a lot about politics – a sophisticated network – seemed to increase an 
individual’s trust in government. The effect was small, but statistically significant. This 
was seen in both reduced models, which varied in which disagreement measure they 
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included. However, this relationship disappeared when political knowledge and strength 
of partisanship were added as controls. The effect of strength of partisanship was seen 
across all models that included controls, and political knowledge had a sizeable, positive 
and statistically significant influence on trust in government as well. This implies that in 
my initial, reduced model the (small) effect of sophistication was partly due to how much 
knowledge an individual’s possesses. The effects of this control variable in itself 
undermines my assumption that political knowledge suppresses trust – recall that this was 
the basis for second hypothesis on network sophistication.  
Network sophistication involves the transfer of political knowledge within a 
discussion. Given this, more knowledgeable individuals should increase the trust of the 
less knowledgeable individuals. However, to better measure this process, we would need 
to run a different type of study. While useful, the ANES data are only measuring how 
much sophistication is in the network (and even this is by proxy of education), and not 
the impact of sophistication on less knowledgeable participants. A future study could be 
set up as an experiment, where several group of friends are first measured on their 
knowledge and trust in government, where participants have different levels of 
knowledge and trust, and where all are directed to participate in political discussion. 
After the discussion the participants would again be measured about their political 
knowledge and trust in government. This might give us more confidence in the 
relationships between discussion, sophistication, and trust in government than the survey 
data presented in this thesis. 
In the reduced models of trust, both measures of network disagreement had no 
influence over trust (though partisan disagreement was close). These initial results refuted 
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my expectation that disagreement would increase trust in government. In the models with 
additional controls, both measures of disagreement continued not to have an effect on 
trust. While I saw some differences with respect to how disagreement is measured, this 
was not all that important for the trust results. From these models, we can argue that 
interpersonal disagreement does not increase trust in the same way that the literature 
suggests that it increase tolerance (Mutz 2006) (that said, I find no evidence that 
disagreement decreases trust, which could be considered a positive).4 
In both reduced models predicating internal efficacy, network sophistication had 
positive and significant effects (just as it did with trust). The models with additional 
controls have some similarities and differences with the trust models. In the first model, 
sophistication becomes statistically insignificant; in the model with the measure of 
network partisan disagreement, network sophistication remains significant. Unlike in the 
case of trust, controlling for political knowledge has no significant effect on internal 
efficacy, but strength of partisanship does remain significant. This shows that while the 
two concepts of trust and internal efficacy are related, different variables affect them 
differently. The effect of average overall network disagreement is not a significant 
predictor of internal efficacy, but average partisan network disagreement is significant. In 
the reduced model partisan disagreement had a significant effect on internal efficacy but 
in the controlled model the effect became insignificant.  
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  It may seem like an oversight not to include a measure of network size in my analyses. I 
did not include my network size variable as a control, because the key network variables 
(sophistication and disagreement) are network averages. These measures already control 
for size when they are created. This can be seen by correlating network size with network 
sophistication and disagreement – they are extremely high and statistically significant 
(see table A.1). 	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Network sophistication again had significant, positive effects in the case of 
external efficacy (see both reduced models – table 6). Just as in the case of internal 
efficacy, network sophistication became insignificant in the controlled model including 
partisan disagreement. In both the reduced and controlled models, overall disagreement 
did not influence external efficacy, or how responsive a person said the government was 
to a person like herself. Interestingly, the effect of partisan disagreement disappeared in 
the controlled model – this says that different social factors predict internal versus 
external political efficacy.  
Looking at other control variables, strength of partisanship again had strongly 
positive effects on external efficacy, while women tended to have higher external 
efficacy levels than men. Education also seems to positively impact external efficacy, 
which is interesting paired with previous research stating that education negatively 
impacts trust (in my analysis, education was not an important factor for trust and internal 
efficacy). Of course, this might also show that external efficacy is different enough from 
trust that education works differently.  
For all three outcomes, with full controls, age does not have any effects. This 
suggests that age was not as important to trust as was expected.  
Future Research  
Across all dependent variables, I found that strength of partisanship was a major 
variable – one that should be controlled for. The strong positive effect of partisanship 
supports my hypothesis about its impacts. Partisanship in this study was scaled from no 
to high identification with any party (that is, strength of partisanship).  It makes sense to 
think that the relationships between partisanship and the dependent variables is due to the 
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amount of involvement in politics that partisans have in compared to independents. If 
partisans are more involved in politics they might believe that their actions have a greater 
impact on the government. They also might trust their party’s leaders more, so they might 
believe that the government is more responsive to the people. In addition, these 
individuals might also have more political knowledge than non-partisans. Since political 
knowledge also had a relationship with the outcomes, more work should be done sorting 
out the two effects. A future study could investigate partisanship and trust in more detail, 
as strength of partisanship seems to be among the most important independent variables 
in my analyses.  
One omission in my analyses is that I did not include a measure of participation, 
nor a measure of ideology within the controlled models. This was an oversight on my part 
and should be investigated in a future study. I am unsure of how participation would 
impact trust, but this should be examined given the Citrin research discussed above. A 
future study should include ideology to determine if it has effects on top of partisanship – 
this could be looked at in terms of strength, or in directional terms. This is, does being a 
liberal or conservative impacts trust, internal efficacy, and external efficacy?   
Another analysis that could be conducted with the 2008-09 ANES survey I would 
involve testing whether the different waves of trust, internal efficacy, and external 
efficacy have the same results as the wave 9 measures. Since the ANES survey was given 
out before and after the 2008 election, it would be interesting to do more with time. The 
key independents variables would be used in the same way as in the present analysis, as 
they were only asked in wave 9 (September, 2008). 
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In appendix B, I include a survey that I drafted as a supplement to the ANES 
analysis. Due to time limits, I did not run it for this study. However, I believe for a future 
study it would provide better measures of trust than the ANES. The ANES only has one 
question about trust and two questions about efficacy (one capturing internal efficacy, 
and one capturing external efficacy). As discussed in the literature review, trust is a 
multifaceted concept. The one question the ANES asks only concerns a small part of 
what trust entails. With the eight questions in the appendix I could create a general trust 
measure that might better capture the concept of overall trust in government. I would also 
be able to test specific areas of trust, and investigate if my independent variables interact 
with them differently with different parts of this overall measure.  
Conclusions 
  Political discussion continues to be heavily researched – this is done to 
determine its benefits on democracy, and to understand how it influences people’s 
attitudes. In this study I add to this growing field by determining how sophistication and 
(types of) disagreement in social networks influence trust in government, which is a key 
aspect of a healthy democratic society. Declining trust in government has potentially 
negative impacts on our democracy. For this reason alone, we should investigate how we 
can improve trust, and the related ideas of internal and external efficacy. Social networks 
represent part of the explanation for trust and efficacy, and by extension, are one of the 
avenues that could be used to increase trust in government. While this study did not 
support either of my expectations for how sophistication and disagreement would impact 
trust, the findings indicate that there are social components to these ideas. More research 
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is needed to better understand the relationship between interpersonal disagreement, 
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Appendix A 
 
Items from the American National Election Study 2008-09 Panel used in the analysis 
 
Trust in Government (dependent variable) 
 
[W2J1] 
How often does the federal government do what most Americans want it to do?  
1. Always 
2. Most of the time 
3. About half of the time 
4. Once in a while 
5. Never  
Note: This item is asked (identically) in waves 2, 9, 10, 11. 
 
Internal Efficacy (dependent variable) 
 
[W9J2] 
How much can people like you affect what the government does? 
1. A great deal 
2. A lot 
3. A moderate amount 
4. A little 
5. Not at all 
Note: This item is asked (identically) in waves 2, 9, 10, 11. 
 
External Efficacy (dependent variable) 
 
[W9J1]  
How much do government officials care what people like you think? 
1. A great deal 
2. A lot 
3. A moderate amount 
4. A little 
5. Not at all 
Note: This item is asked (identically) in waves 2, 9, 10, 11. 
 
Political Discussion/Social Networks (key independent variables) 
 
[W9ZD1]  
During the last six months, did you talk with anyone face-to-face, on the phone, by email, 
or in any other way about government or elections, or did you not do this with anyone 
during the last six months? 
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1. Yes, did talk ___ 
2. No, did not talk ___ 
[W9ZD2] 
What are the first names of the people who you talked with about government or 
elections during the past six months? 
Please be sure not to type the same name for two different people. If two people have the 
same name, please be sure to type two different names below, like “John” and “John 
Junior” or “older John” and “younger John.” 
1. Name ___ 
2. Name ___ 
3. Name ___ 
4. Name ___ 
5. Name ___ 
6. Name ___ 
7. Name ___ 
8. Name ___ 
[ZD12] 
Generally speaking, does (NAME) probably think of (himself/herself) as a Democrat, 




4. Something else___ 
[ZD14] 
Would (he/she/he or she) call (himself/herself/himself or herself) a strong Democrat or a 
not very strong Democrat? 
1. Strong___ 
2. Not very strong___ 
[ZD15] 
Would (he/she/he or she) call (himself/herself/himself or herself) a strong Republican or 
a not very strong Republican? 
1. Strong___ 
2. Not very strong___ 
[ZD16] 
Does (he/she/he or she) think of (himself/herself/himself or herself) as closer to the 
Democratic Party, the Republican Party, or neither of these? 
1. Closer to the Democratic Party___ 
2. Closer to the Republican Party___ 




[REPEAT FOR THE FIRST THREE NAMES MENTIONED IN ZD2.] 
In general, how different are (NAME)’s opinions about government and elections from 
your own views? 
1. Extremely Different ___ 
2. Very Different ___ 
3. Moderately Different ___ 
4. Slightly Different ___ 
5. Not different at all ___ 
[W9ZD17] 
FILL NAME BELOW WITH NAME FROM ZD2. REPEAT THE QUESTION FOR 
THE FIRST THREE NAMES MENTIONED IN ZD2.] 
How interested is (NAME) in information about what’s going on in government and 
politics? Extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested, slightly interested, 
or not interested at all? 
1. Extremely interested ___ 
2. Very interested ___ 
3. Moderately interested ___ 
4. Slightly interested ___ 
5. Not interested at all ___ 





Do you happen to know how many times an individual can be elected President of the 
United States under current laws? 
Type the number___ 
 
[W2U3] 
For how many years is a United States Senator elected – that is, how many years are there 
in one full term of office for a U.S. Senator? 
Type the number___ years 
  
[W2U4] 
How many U.S. Senators are there from each state? 
Type the number____ 
 
[W2U5] 
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For how many years is a member of the United States House of Representatives 
elected—that is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a U.S. House 
member? 
Type the number____ years 
 
[W2U6] 
According to federal law, if the President of the United States dies, is no longer willing or 
able to serve, or is removed from office by Congress, the Vice President would become 
the President. 
If the Vice President were unable or unwilling to serve, who would be eligible to become 
president next?  
1. ___Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
2. ___Secretary of State 
3. ___Speaker of the House of Representatives 
[W2U6] 
What percentage vote of the House and the Senate is needed to override a Presidential 
veto? 






When it comes to politics, would you describe yourself as liberal, conservative, or neither 
liberal nor conservative? 
1. Liberal ___ 
2. Conservative ___ 
3. Neither liberal nor conservative ___ 
[W2K2] 
IF LIBERAL: Would you call yourself very liberal or somewhat liberal? 
1. Very Liberal ___ 
2. Somewhat Liberal ___ 
[W2K3] 
IF CONSERVATIVE: Would you call yourself very conservative or somewhat 
conservative? 
1. Very Conservative ___ 
2. Somewhat Conservative ___ 
[W2K4] 
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IF NEITHER LIBERAL NOR CONSERVATIVE (i.e. if K1=3 or K1=-7): Do you think 
of yourself as closer to liberals, or conservatives, or neither of these? 
1. Closer to liberal ___ 
2. Closer to conservatives ___ 
3. Neither of these ___ 
Partisanship 
 
[W9L1] [W9L2]  
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
independent, or what? 
1. Republican ___ 
2. Democrat ___ 
3. Independent ___ 
4. Something else ___ 
[W9L5] 
Would you call yourself a strong [Democrat/Republican] or a not very strong 
[Democrat/Republican]? 
1. Strong [Democrat/Republican] 
2. Not very Strong [Democrat/Republican] 
[W9L6] 
Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party? 
1. Closer to the Republican Party 





What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? 
1. No schooling completed ___ 
2. Nursery school to 4th grade ___ 
3. 5th or 6th grade ___ 
4. 7th or 8th grade ___ 
5. 9th grade ___ 
6. 10th grade ___ 
7. 11th grade ___ 
8. 12th grade no diploma ___ 
9. high school graduate high school Diploma or the equivalent (GED] ___ 
10. Some college, no degree ___ 
11. Associate degree___ 
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12. Bachelor’s degree ___ 
13. Master’s degree ___ 


































	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Milman	  	  39	  








3. Decline to state 
 
How old are you? 
____ 
  
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 
1. Less than high school 
2. Some college 
3. Associates degree 
4. Bachelors degree 
5. Masters Degree 
6. PHD/Professional Degree (JD or MD) 
 
What is your income or if you are a dependent what is you parent’s income? 
 











12. More than $150,000 
 
What is your combined household income? 
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11. $100,000-$149,999 
12. More than $150,000 
 
What is your race? 
 
1. White 
2. White, non-Hispanic 
3. African-American 
4. Hispanic 
5. Asian-Pacific Islander 
6. Native American 
7. Other  
8. Decline to answer 
 












How often to do participate in campaigns, town meetings, take part in protests, and/or 
lobby or write politicians? 
 
1. Never 
2. Almost never 
3. Sometimes 
4. Often 
5. Very often 
 
Which statement describes your partisanship the best? 
 
1. Strong Democrat 
2. Democrat 
3. Weak Democrat 
4. Independent 
5. Weak Republican 
6. Republican 




How much do you trust the federal government in general? 
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How much do you trust Congress in general? 
 








How much do you trust the Supreme Court in general? 
 








How much do you trust the Executive branch in general? 
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How honest are politicians? 
 









How benevolent is the federal government? 
 








Do you believe the American political process works? 
 








What policy makes you distrust the government the most? 
________ 
 














8. 7  or more times 




How often does disagreement arise in your political discussions? 
 
1. Never 
2. Almost never 
3. Sometimes 
4. Almost always 
5. Always 
 
What are the general political leanings of your social network? 
 
1. Mostly Democrats 
2. Mostly Independents 
3. Mostly Republicans 
 
How detailed/sophisticated/complex/nuanced are your political discussions?  
 









Do you know how many times an individual can be elected President of the United States 
under current laws? 
_____ 
 
How many years are there in one full term of office for a U.S. Senator? 
_____years 
 
How many U.S. senators are there from each state? 
_____ 
 
How many years are there is one full term of office for a U.S. House member? 
____years 
 
According to federal law, if the President of the United States dies, is no longer willing or 
able to serve, or is removed from office by Congress, the Vice President would become 
the President. If the Vice President was unable or unwilling to serve, who would be 
eligibleto become president next? 
 
1. Speaker of the House of Representatives 
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2. Secretary of the State 
3. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
 
What percentage vote of the House and the Senate is needed to override a Presidential 
veto? 
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Table	  A.1	  
Correlations between Key Variables and Network Size  











0.91 0.74 0.38 0.22 0.09 0.10 0.08 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
External efficacy, Internal Efficacy, and Trust data is taken from wave 9 
Data taken from ANES 2008-2009 survey 
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Tables	  	  
Table	  1	  
Means of Trust, External and Internal Efficacy 
 Trust External efficacy Internal Efficacy 
 Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs 
Wave 2 2.41  1447 2.37 1445 2.61 1447 
Wave 9 2.43 2733 2.44 2737 2.69 2736 
Wave 10 2.39 2689 2.40 1356 2.59 2692 
Wave 11 2.53 2664 2.69 2665 2.75 2664 
Min/Max 1 5  1 5  1 5  
Data taken from ANES 2008-2009 survey 	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Table	  	  2	  
Means of Independent Variables  
 Mean Obs Min Max 
Network size 2.28 2656 0 3 
Disagreement (overall) 1.79 2633 0 5 
Sophistication 8.61 2584 0 14 
Disagreement Partisan 0.29 2633 0 1 
Age 50.78 4240 18 90 
Education 3.36 3222 1 5 
Income 12.23 3187 1 19 
Partisanship, wave 9   2.95 2733 0 6 
Know 4.01 1298 0 6 
Data taken from ANES 2008-2009 survey  	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Table	  3	  














1       
Disagree 
(overall) 




0.40 0.57 1     
0.00 0.00 
Know 0.26 0.21 0.12 1    
0.00 0.00 0.00 
External 
Efficacy 
0.11 0.06 -0.00 0.04 1   
0.00 0.00 0.83 0.13 
Internal 
efficacy 
0.09 0.07 -0.04 0.06 0.45 1  
0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.00 
Trust 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.13 0.49 0.42 1 
0.00 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 
External efficacy, Internal Efficacy, and Trust data is taken from wave 9 
Data taken from ANES 2008-2009 survey 	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Table	  4	  
Trust in Govt. (reduced models), OLS Regression Estimates  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Coeff. Std. error p-value Coeff. Std. Error p-value 
Sophistication 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Disagreement  
(Overall) 
-0.00 0.02 0.97 --- --- --- 
Partisan 
Disagree 
--- --- --- -0.06 0.04 0.17 
Model 
Statistics 
N=2580 Adj. R2=0.01 
F=12.06(0.00) 
N=2580 Adj. R2=0.01 
F=13.00(0.00) 	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Table	  5	  
Internal Efficacy in Govt. (reduced models), OLS Regression Estimates  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Coeff. Std. error p-value Coeff. Std. Error p-value 
Sophistication 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Disagreement  
(Overall) 
-0.01 0.03 0.78 --- --- --- 
Disagreement 
Partisanship 
--- --- --- -0.26 0.06 0.00 
Model 
Statistics 
N=2582 Adj. R2=0.01 
F=10.43(0.00) 
N=2582 Adj. R2=0.01 
F=18.95(0.00) 	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Table	  6	  
External Efficacy in Govt. (reduced models), OLS Regression Estimates 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Coeff. Std. error p-value Coeff. Std. Error p-value 
Sophistication 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Disagreement  
(Overall) 
-0.04 0.02 0.11 --- --- --- 
Disagree 
Partisanship 
--- --- --- -0.15 0.06 0.01 
Model 
Statistics 
N=2581 Adj. R2=0.01 
F=17.87(0.00) 
N=2581 Adj. R2=0.01 
F=20.35(0.00) 	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Table	  7	  
Trust in Govt. (controlled models), OLS Regression Estimates 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Coeff. Std. error p-value Coeff. Std. error p-value 
Sophistication 0.00 0.01 0.62 0.01 0.02 0.13 
Disagreement 
(Overall) 
0.02 0.03 0.43 --- --- --- 
Disagreement 
Partisanship 
--- --- --- 0.01 0.07 0.93 
Age 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.01 0.85 
Gender -0.06 0.04 0.18 -0.06 0.04 0.17 
Income 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.19 
Education -0.00 0.02 0.93 -0.00 0.02 0.89 
Knowledge 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.01 
Partisanship 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.00 
Model 
Statistics 
N=1132 Adj. R2=0.04 F=6.38(0.00) N=1132 Adj. R2=0.04 
F=6.30(0.00) 	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Table	  8	  
Internal efficacy in Govt. (controlled models), OLS Regression Estimates 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Coeff. Std. error p-value Coeff. Std. error p-value 
Sophistication 0.01 0.01 0.37 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Disagreement 
(Overall) 
0.01 0.04 0.74 --- --- --- 
Disagreement 
Partisanship 
--- --- --- -0.19 0.10 0.06 
Age 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.37 
Gender 0.07 0.06 0.27 0.06 0.06 0.34 
Income -0.01 0.01 0.28 -0.01 0.01 0.25 
Education 0.04 0.03 0.24 0.03 0.03 0.29 
Knowledge 0.02 0.02 0.41 0.02 0.02 0.39 
Partisanship 0.19 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.03 0.00 
Model 
Statistics 
N=1133 Adj. R2=0.05 F=8.16(0.00) N=1133 Adj. R2=0.05 
F=8.61(0.00) 	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Table	  9	  
External Efficacy in Govt. (controlled models), OLS Regression Estimates 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Coeff. Std. error p-value Coeff. Std. error p-value 
Sophistication 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Disagreement 
(Overall) 
-0.01 0.04 0.78 --- --- --- 
Disagreement 
Partisanship 
--- --- --- -0.07 0.09 0.45 
Age 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.29 
Gender 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.13 0.05 0.02 
Income 0.00 0.01 0.65 0.00 0.01 0.66 
Education 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.02 
Knowledge -0.00 0.02 0.85 -0.00 0.02 0.84 
Partisanship 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.03 0.00 
Model 
Statistics 
N=1132 Adj. R2=0.05 F=7.73(0.00) N=1132 Adj. R2=0.05 
F=7.80(0.00) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
